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Justice in the 20th Century
Jerome Hall*
"Justice in the 20th Century" has as many meanings as there are
moral and social philosophies,' and academic opinion ranges over the
entire spectrum. Some sophisticates think "justice" is only the symbol
of an irrational hope whose function is to arouse the emotions of creatures addicted to self-deception, while at the opposite extreme are the
contemporary adherents of classical natural law realism. In view of
the general abandonment and criticism in contemporary moral philosophy of emotive positivism, its invalidity will be assumed in this discussion; accordingly, it will also be assumed that "justice" is a meaningful term. But instead of the currently popular linguistic analysis of the
uses of that term, the present approach will be focused on specific problems; and while it is believed that 20th century justice is unique in some
ways, any analysis of justice must deal with such traditional ideas as
equality, desert and responsibility. At the same time, if that is done
realistically, it must be "relevant," as the saying goes, to 20th century
conditions and problems. Because they are frequently variations of
one of Kant's versions of the categorical imperative, most philosophical
discussions of justice are carried on at a very high level of abstraction;
they culminate in very broad generalizations remote from the practical
problems of 20th century justice. Accordingly, an effort will be made
to present a more pointed analysis. If high-level abstraction is the
Scylla of any venture on the tortuous path to the elucidation of "justice
in the 20th century," its Charybdis is the easy reward of applause for an
oration on human rights.
Another lesson to be learned from the frustration of trying to make
definite sense of very abstract discussions of justice is that it is illusory
to imagine that one can construct a satisfactory formula or definition
of justice. One can say, for example, that justice is the ultimate social
ideal or that it is the ideal ordering of the community, but such slogans
do not take one very far, and they may discourage the study of justice
in particular areas. Justice in this century has penetrated into so many
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fields and is interrelated with so many other values that any concept of
justice that is sufficiently extensive is also inevitably vacuous. Perhaps the best that can be done is to discern important changes and
trends, recognize the underlying values, and concentrate on specific
problems. The fact that we cannot learn much from a formula does not
lessen the significance of cogent probings and partial insights into the
quality of 20th century justice.
If we cast a reflective eye over 20th century world events, the obvious fact is that this century represents anything but a single-minded effort to attain justice in any honorific sense of that term. If there is increased sensitivity to the values of human dignity, we in this century
have also witnessed the expression of uninhibited barbarism on a scale
unparalleled in the darkest eras of history. Despite the maxim that
the only thing men learn from history is that men do not learn from history, there is one fact that we should bear in mind: that is, the proved
capacity and willingness of normal persons to inflict on innocent human beings what Judge Biddle, in his report on the Niirnberg trial,
called "appalling atrocities." Of course, we need to balance that by taking account of acts of heroism, devotion and compassion; what emerges
as credible is a dualism or ambivalence that renders optimistic accounts
of human nature irrelevant to the actual problems of justice.
The nature of human nature greatly affects the most pressing
problems of justice in this century, problems that concern the criminal
law and economic goods and burdens. These areas fall respectively
within Aristotle's division of justice into corrective and distributive justice;2 by focusing on important aspects of those two areas we may be
able to discover some characteristics of 20th century justice.
I
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

The salient 20th century fact about criminal law is widespread
skepticism of punishment. Punishment is said to be ineffective; after
centuries of punishment, crime seems to be on the increase, penitentiaries are written off as schools of crime and retribution is sharply disparaged as, at best, a disguised form of vengeance. Accordingly, if
both deterrence and retribution are excluded from the orbit of a legal
policy, only rehabilitation remains as the single rational goal. And if,
as many of its proponents say, retributive punishment is the only kind
of criminal justice there is, the upshot of the current criticism is that
2. Corrective justice concerns not only crimes, but also torts, breaches of contract and other harms or damage for which restitution, compensation, punishment and
treatment are the appropriate sanctions. Distributive justice deals with different situa-

tions-not with harmdoers, but with the allotment of values, including economic goods.
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criminal justice is obsolete. What is wanted is love or mercy and tender
care-not justice.
Among the many reasons for the current mood is the popular
reading of Freudian psychiatry. Freudian psychiatry seems to be deterministic and amoral and, therefore, incompatible with traditional
ideas of responsibility and punishment for voluntary harm-doing. On
the premise of cause and effect, a mental illness or a crime is traced back
to what is viewed as the inevitable conditioning, especially by early
family life, that caused the illness or crime: the allegedly unmitigated
aggressiveness and selfishness of human nature are checked only by
expediency. The sense of justice or, if one prefers, the sense of injustice and the voluntarism that are the foundations of western morality
becomes mere superstition; talk about the justice of punishment is only
a habit.
The matter, however, is more complicated than that. Freud, himself, said he was not a Freudian, and there is much in his work that
raises doubts about the current criticism of punishment by some of his
avowed disciples. Freud was discussing people who had serious problems, hence his psychiatry cannot be interpreted as generalizing over
all human nature or as holding that the unconscious dominates everyone's conduct. He was intent on making his patients aware of their
unconscious drives so that "where id was, there shall ego be." Thus, at
bottom, he was a rationalist; indeed, he believed the criminal law to be
the principal barrier to instinctual drive and as such the basic condition
of civilization. Moreover, when Freud acted as a therapist he did not
think on a deterministic basis. Rather, he reasoned from the present
condition ahead to a future, improved one; he premised that effort counts
and that the future is not determined. Certainly, it is plain that unless
human beings are morally responsible, unless they are free agents to a
significant degree, justice is only a mirage. We should, therefore, confine determinism to the arena of scientific investigation, while in the
realm of daily action, personal responsibility and its corollary, punishment, remain persuasive. Moreover, there are other psychiatries than
Freud's, and in some of them personal responsibility is the central thesis;
there is common sense and the experience of daily life, which should not
be supinely abandoned in the face of psychiatric dogmatism.
On the constructive side, psychiatry has made a very important
contribution to 20th century justice by evoking a heightened appreciation of the emotional side of personality and of the conflicts and confusion that assail some persons much more drastically than they do
other persons. What seemed a cold-blooded murder by a person who
looks perfectly normal, may, after thorough psychiatric examination, be
understood as an act of desperation or explosion by an irrational, emo-
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tionally torn victim of uncontrollable forces. The old model of a "war
on crime" has suffered greatly from the psychiatric exposure of relevant
facts. Indeed, some persons find it easier to identify themselves with
criminals rather than with their victims; even for many who identify with
the victims, punishment is questioned as an inadequate response. Rehabilitation is widely espoused in this century, but the insistence that
rehabilitation is the only rational goal to be sought needs to be carefully scrutinized.
Lady Barbara Wootton, the leader of rehabilitationism in Britain,
takes her stand on the thesis that responsibility should be "by-passed"
and allowed to "wither away." In her view, since "mental health and
ill-health cannot be defined in objective scientific terms that are free of
subjective moral judgments, it follows that we have no reliable criterion
by which to distinguish the sick from the healthy mind."'3 This is
brilliant strategy, indeed, and if it is also sound the injustice of imprisoning some persons while acquitting others on the ground of their
mental incompetence-their irresponsibility-is obvious.
So, too,
since punishment rests on the premise that personal responsibility is
meaningful, it collapses if that premise is invalidated.
The literature on "mental health" and "mental disease" is voluminous, and literally hundreds of definitions, for diverse purposes and in
dissimilar contexts, have been formulated by persons in various professions. It is no exaggeration to say, as one critic remarked, that the
meaning of mental disease "is personal to each practitioner," that it reflects each definer's Weltanschauung, his vision of the Good Life. Some
psychiatrists have said that everybody is mentally ill, and others, that
all criminals are mentally ill, and so on and on.
Nevertheless, the thesis that responsibility must be "by-passed" and
allowed to "wither away" is not a necessary consequence of the lack of
an objective definition of "mental disease." In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish the definition of "psychosis" from that of "mental
disease." The boundless diversity of definitions of "mental disease"
does not imply that there is equally wide disagreement regarding the
definition of "psychosis." Second, and more important, defining terms
is a philosophical or linguistic task, while decision-making is a function
of practical judgment. There is, for example, a voluminous literature
on the definition of "good." But the lack of a consensus or other solution of this theoretical problem does not invalidate innumerable daily
decisions that certain conduct is good or bad. Judges may be unable
to define "stare decisis" or "ratio decidendi," but this does not detract
from their insight and skill in deciding specific cases. So, too, the fact
that there is little or no agreement regarding the definition of "mental
3.

B.

WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

227 (1959).
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disease" or even "psychosis" (if that is the fact) does not imply that psychiatrists do not agree that at least some persons are seriously mentally
diseased or that those judgments are wholly subjective. Indeed, some
psychiatrists have said that laymen are equally able to recognize extreme cases of mental illness; that laymen cannot give a satisfactory
definition of "insanity," "know," "right" and "wrong" does not invalidate their findings. The inevitable conclusion is that neither the theory
of the unconscious nor the subjectivity of definitions of "mental disease"
has shown that responsibility and punishment are obsolete.
We may now look directly at some of the implications of the claim
that rehabilitation is the only sound objective to be sought, that deterrence and retributive justice should be discarded. From a strictly
therapeutic viewpoint, any limit on the period of confinement is unsound; hence, the rule of law that has traditionally protected the individual from the arbitrariness or oppression of officials must be discarded and for it substituted the opinion of experts (whose disagreements
inter se are notorious) that the offender has been cured and is no longer
dangerous.
Next, certain petty harm-doers4 might require very long confinement to reeducate them, while, at the opposite extreme, some murderers and large-scale embezzlers may not need reeducation. A cause
c~l~bre in the last century was that of Harvard's Professor Webster who,
having socially ambitious daughters and a wife with expensive tastes,
borrowed a large sum of money; when a nagging bill collector became
very offensive, the professor hit him on the head, put his body in lime,
and was later convicted of murder. In the last depression one Whitney,
a stock broker, who had been educated at the best schools and by all
other, perhaps sounder, standards was an able, successful man made off
with seven million dollars when his financial need became acute.
Thousands of embezzlers, perpetrators of fraud and professional thieves
of jewelry and securities and many others are very talented persons; indeed, white collar crime on a large scale is predominately perpetrated
by persons who are much brighter and often better educated than the
personnel of even the best prisons. Rehabilitation has little meaning
in these cases except for those who accept the dogma that there must be
something seriously wrong with every criminal.
Other difficulties in extreme or exclusive rehabilitationism are even
more serious than those discussed above. The common assumption
underlying the shift in current attitudes, aided by congenital American
optimism, is that if only we spend enough millions and train many
more psychiatrists, vocational guidance experts and others, we will ac4. Pickpockets, having learned a difficult, lucrative trade, are among these
petty harm-doers.
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quire the necessary knowledge and the know-how to reform all, or
nearly all criminals. But even Lady Wootton ruefully acknowledged
that "clear evidence that reformative measures do in fact reform would
be very welcome." 5 This is the hard fact that is difficult to face: that
even as regards offenders who obviously lack education and decent family background, reform remains on an ad hoc, common sense level;
any knowledge of rehabilitation that might be called "expert," not to say
"scientific," is wholly lacking. I do not in the least imply that we
should let up in our efforts to reform criminals. The conditions in
many prisons are deplorable, and the personnel can obviously be improved. Our own peace of mind requires us to do everything possible
to make peno-correctional institutions humanely and intelligently administered. That is one of the principal reasons for including rehabilitation among the objectives of our criminal law; but for many reasons,
some of which were discussed above, rehabilitation cannot be the only
objective that is sought.
Since reform is irrelevant in some cases and impossible in many
others, a place must be found for punishment that deters and is just.
Deterrence, alone, is not acceptable because, unmitigated by justice, it
becomes cruelty. In a country where the hands of thieves were ampuThe measures taken
tated, theft became practically non-existent.
against civilians by occupying armies when one of the soldiers had been
shot are well known, and were very effective. On the other hand,
the conviction of Al Capone led to widespread compliance with the
tax laws by many unsavory characters, guards on New York subways reduced crime there by half and the strikes of police in Boston,
Liverpool and Copenhagen were marked by a sharp rise in criminal activity. For these various reasons, only an integrative theory6 will suffice-one in which a defensible place is found for justice and deterrence and rehabilitation. There may be cases when one of these objectives is at odds with the others, and there is no easy solution of that
problem despite efforts to increase the flexibility of the law as well as
the competence of judges and administrators.
In the present climate of academic opinion I must emphasize that
justice in criminal law-in the strict sense of retributive justice-is an
application of deontological ethics. In this view there is a significant
degree of autonomy in normal adults, the principle of voluntarism is
basic and, accordingly, if a normal adult voluntarily harms a human
being in a way proscribed by the criminal law, he is deemed to be
guilty and deserving of punishment that is proportionate to the harm
done. Overlooked by the critics of retributive justice is that it is impor5.
6.

B. WooTroN, supra note 3, at 335.

J.

HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 303-08 (2d ed. 1960).
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tant to make sense of our lives here and now in ways that sometimes do
not have the slightest reference to a future utility. Retributive justice
makes the present rational and tolerable, for example, by distinguishing
a brutal attack on a defenseless person from a heroic effort to save a
life; it requires that our officials express public condemnation of the
former by the appropriate action of just punishment. The just treatment of human beings as morally accountable persons gives to criminal justice a hard side that is prominent in its applications to voluntary
harm-doers. Some utilitarians find it convenient to forget this although
they are strong advocates of freedom and oppose extreme rehabilitationism on the ground that "by-passing" responsibility would diminish freedom. But they do not face the limitations of a purely utilitarian approach
-that justice cannot always be dissolved in utility and is needed to
restrain deterrence even when it might increase the common good; and
while they are very confident that they can predict and even measure the
distant consequences of punishment, they ignore the rational need to
make the present significant by expressing thoughtful, appropriate valuations.
In sum, what merits consideration in 20th century criminal jurisprudence is not the thesis that justice is obsolete but that it should be
tempered by compassion and genuine efforts to rehabilitate. We
should not forget that justice depends on truth and since our knowledge is limited, justice should be tempered by mercy. This sentiment
has been implemented by the use of probation, suspended sentences,
the pre-sentence hearing, parole and other methods of flexible administration within the limits set by law. There has also been a wider recognition of the difference between merely personal deviation and criminal
conduct, and there has been greater realization of the futility of punishing confirmed alcoholics and drug addicts. 7 Some students of the criminal law have gone even farther, urging that mere negligently caused
harms should be wholly excluded from the criminal law and that the restriction of punishment to voluntary harm-doing would strengthen that
institution.' Thus, while justice now, as always, is concerned with responsibility and desert, the principles based on these values do not operate in a vacuum, for their current meaning is discovered and applied by
reference to relevant facts. What is criminal justice now depends very
much on the relation of the above values to the facts and knowledge
psychiatry has adduced, and, also, on their relation to the feeling of
compassion that motivates the rehabilitationist movement.
7. Hal, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3
U. Cm. L. REV. 345, 367-69, 373 (1936). See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS op
THE CRimiNAL. SANCON (1968).
8. Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63
COLuM. L. REv. 632 (1963).
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II
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The distinction between the two kinds of justice brings into focus
differences between the 18th century state and 20th century states.
More precisely, the earlier, principally negative, objective of law of
maintaining order must be contrasted with the more complex objectives
of 20th century law, the latter considered in the light of the state's many
functions, grants, and encouragement of undertakings. The hard line
often drawn between these objectives is an over-simplification of history," but even if qualitative distinctions are untenable, the complexity of
these functions of the contemporary state and the quantitative rise of
services that concern distributive justice are apparent. The above distinction is also involved in jurisprudential theories of the structure of
law, for example, whether the Austinian or the Kelsenian concept of law
in terms of harm-sanction is adequate or even relevant to the structure
of social welfare law. The first question to be considered in this context is whether economic rights are substantively different from the traditional civil rights.
The recent very large literature on human rights has produced at
least as much confusion as it has enlightenment of 20th century justice.
Therefore the first step needed to clarify that subject is to limit the objectives of any discussion. Accordingly, I shall not try to discover whether
a concept of justice that takes account of the State's social and economic
functions is a unique 20th century phenomenon. Nor shall I speculate
about the meaning of "social welfare state" or about justice in such a
state as compared with justice in a predominantly free enterprise society.
Instead, I shall first try to clarify some of the puzzles about human rights
by drawing necessary distinctions; then, I shall discuss certain aspects of
justice that are relevant to recent developments in American law, and,
finally, I shall point to some common features of criminal justice and
economic justice.
Writers on human rights should distinguish recommended from potential and emerging rights, moral from legal rights, and paper legal
rights from law-in-action. Next, or perhaps simultaneously, one should
ask, what is the particular writer's moral philosophy? Postivists of
various types, classical natural lawyers, Kantians and utilitarians use the
9. The difficulty of maintaining such a historical thesis is shown by the fact
that even Adam Smith said that the state has the duty of "erecting and maintaining
certain public works and certain public institutions" set up "for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people." A.
SMITH, NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NAnONs 681, 682 (1937). Roadbuilding, canals, harbors, the post office, public education, prevention of epidemics
and other health measures have for centuries been recognized as public interests that
the state is expected to promote.
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same words, but they mean very different things. On the one hand,
Kelsen's "justice" means an irrational ideology, an emotion or a taste
that is wholly subjective and personal and, therefore, quite outside the
realm of cognition. On the other hand, the classical realist's justice
connotes an ontological constitution-the "nature of things," including
human nature, to which that term refers. Between these extremes are
Kant's idealism and utilitarianism, and these underlie still other concepts
or interpretations of justice. Writings on justice or rights must, therefore,
be read in a relativistic way, that is, in relation to the writer's moral
philosophy; also, if positivism is laid aside, as is implicit in this discussion, the other perspectives can be related to deontological and utilitarian
ethics, and the reader should recall that in the above discussion of punishment I suggested that reliance on both is necessary in the construction of an adequate theory of 20th century justice.
Justice in this century concerns problems regarding which action
by the state is said to be desirable; a just legal system is, therefore, the
most important part of 20th century justice. But since any legal system
falls short of the ideal of justice, as is shown by the fact that even the best
legal system can be criticized on moral grounds, as in Plato's Statesman, the concept of justice includes, but is wider than, that attainable
by just law.
That legal remedies are needed to secure justice implies the use
of the coercive power of the state. In one sense coercion and freedom
are antithetical, but since coercion is necessary to the maintenance of order and since order is the necessary condition of freedom, coercion, if
wisely employed, results in the maximum actual freedom. If the essence of justice is equality in the sense of proscribing superficial or arbitrary discrimination, and if that is to be implemented by law, the unwarranted curtailment of freedom is a constant hazard. Justice requires
that officials be free to discover arbitrary inequalities and to make and
enforce the relevant laws, and, again, if anyone is to be free, there must
be order. Thus, neither justice nor any of the related values can survive
in a disorderly society. If the courts cannot be depended upon to function in a uniform way, if crime is rampant and people do not keep their
promises, life, liberty, business transactions, and equality are all jeopardized. Since all values depend on order, since anarchy is the ultimate
evil, it would seem that if any priority is to be given any one of those
values, it should be ascribed to order. However, an order that is unjust and that crushes freedom cannot be indefinitely sustained. There
are, accordingly, sensitive and intricate interrelations among these values, and it is only in the detailed study of specific problems that defensible decisions can be made concerning which values are to be preferred
in each context, which sacrifices are to be made, which hazards raised.
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The fact that extreme unfairness is almost universally recognized within
given cultures is some evidence that there are rational criteria of evaluation when the problems are studied in specific contexts. Even then
there are often disagreements, for example, whether homosexual practices among consenting adults should be criminal. But two points are
noteworthy about such issues: First, disagreement on marginal questions does not negate or diminish the consensus, sometimes almost universal, on core questions; and, second, such disagreement does not negate the significance of relevant agreement that greatly narrows the extent of the difference. Everyone agrees that the past sentences for homosexuality-in some states, 40 years imprisonment or more-are barbaric.
Justice that depends on compulsion is limited in what it can do
even on recognition that legal sanctions affect not only external behavior, but also conscience. Since the law is a relatively crude instrument in other respects, resulting, for instance, from its generality, it cannot accomplish everything that ought to be accomplished. This indicates that the justice manifested by even the best legal system, including
the discretionary practices of officials, requires supplementation by welldirected efforts of lay individuals. Moreover, much more than simply
recognizing the coercive power of the state and the necessity of lay
supplementation is involved in elucidating the problems of justice in the
20th century. The implementation of certain economic rights by the
large body of legislation concerning workmen's compensation, unemployment, old age, sickness, and poverty may not be valid or enduring.
Attempts may be made to repeal all of those laws, or, more probably,
many changes will be proposed. What must be studied, therefore, are
the moral and philosophical foundations of those and other alleged human rights.
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' °
states, "whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . ." Then, the
Declaration lists two sets of rights. Articles 1 to 20 consist mostly of
our traditional or classical civil rights, those of life, liberty, equality,
property, justice, freedom of speech, movement and association, religious
liberty, fair trial, and others. Article 21 adds the right of participation
in government directly or "through freely chosen representatives." Articles 22 to 28 prescribe so-called "economic rights," such as to "a
standard of living adequate for . . . health and well-being," to insurance against "unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age
10.

G.A. Res. 217 (I)

A, 2 U.N. GAOR 71 (1948).
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or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond [his] control," to
education and participation in the community's cultural life, "to work, to
free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work,"
"to form and join trade unions" and the right "to rest and leisure . . .
and periodic holidays with pay." Such a pervasive declaration of human rights necessarily raises many questions concerning distributive justice.

Obviously, all the rights listed in the Declaration are not legal
rights, and some of them may not even survive criticism as moral rights.
Some are recognized or actualized as moral duties or in legal systems,
but others are ideals. Several countries did not ratify the Declaration,
and in others whose constitutions contain many provisions on civil rights
and economic rights, the rights may be merely paper rights, with dissent ruthlessly crushed, free elections non-existent, and travel, especially emigration, forbidden or strictly limited. All will agree, however,
that in the United States, 20th century justice must be more than the
mere formality of enactment; it must include law-in-action. 1 '
. The justification for asserting that human beings have certain
moral rights must be examined. The three grounds of justification emphasized in recent literature, the dignity of man, natural needs, and
the fact that men are the only beings who make claims, are all controversial assertions; they are but three of the many answers given to the
question, "What is man?"
Although under the Freudian or Hobbesian view there is little to
support assertions of the dignity of man or to stimulate respect for him,
many have disagreed with those philosophers' position that at best,
those terms are irrelevant. The classical Greeks made reason and sociality the essential human characteristics, and St. Thomas postulated
the natural or normal movement of the will towards the good. The
sophistication of these philosophers-Greek drama gives ample evidence that they were familiar with the seamy side of human naturemakes it plain that they did not mean to say that all men, or most men
all the time, are rational and social. Nor, on the other hand, can we
dismiss their statements as mere exhortation or as exercises in utopia.
Rather, they were saying, apparently, that men at their best have those
qualities of mind and spirit; and thus "rational-social" was employed as
both a descriptive and a normative term. In that sense, human beings
are distinctive in ways that make them the only discoverers, if not
creators, of justice and other values. They share a common ineffable
quality evidenced by the fact, among others, that unfair discrimination
stimulates a sense of injustice in normal circumstances.
11.

J. HALL, COMPARAnTVE LAW AND SocIAL THEORY 69-87 (1963).
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"Natural need" is a corollary of what is required for self-realization, the fulfillment of potential personality. To a considerable extent
this is a cultural matter, and material well-being, including ownership of
television sets and automobiles, may not represent the best measure of
satisfaction of natural needs; Buddha and St. Francis, for example, seem
to have had very positive ideas about the uses of poverty. What seems
basic in the notion of natural need is that men have never been satisfied merely to exist. They have sought excitement, novelty, and experience of the higher values, often at the risk of survival. This dissatisfaction with mere existence, of course, is expressed in the asserted right
to share in the educational and cultural resources of the community.
There are limits on the utility of the concept of "natural need." A
man who has ten children needs three times as much money as a man
with only two children if both families are to enjoy the same style of life.
But even in those countries that claim to be especially receptive to the
slogan, "from each according to his ability to contribute, to each according to his need," there is great disparity in the incomes of managers,
leaders and scientists as compared to that of the unskilled workers.
And apart from the question (and natural need) of incentives to motivate people to put forth their best efforts in order to maximize the total
social product, there are other natural needs to be considered, such as
the need for freedom and the normal expectation of persons who are
superior because they worked hard to improve themselves.
The third recently asserted ground in support of human rights,
that man is unique in that only he makes claims, is said to be evidence of
his dignity. But while the recent literature on justice is full of discussions of claims and rights, there is lacking any reference to duty;
consequently, the literature is often mistaken in the elucidation of
"'claim" or "right."
There is a very different tradition, notably the Kantian one, in
which duty is primary and paramount. It is from that perspective that
Hegel's otherwise puzzling statement about the right of the criminal to
be punished becomes understandable. A normal adult is a person especially in the sense that he is a being or creature with moral obligations,
and if he voluntarily harms a human being, he merits apt treatment as
a person in the above sense; he therefore has a right to be punished, not
conditioned as a child or an animal. It is also noteworthy that while
rights always have correlative duties, there are some duties, for example,
those of charity, that have no correlative rights. 12 Some legal philosophers have also said that duties are paramount because sanctions are
attached to their breach, and because, while all legal rights have cor12.

See text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
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relative legal duties, some legal duties, those concerning criminal law,
for instance, do not have correlative legal rights.
One need not decide whether right or duty is the more important
or "basic" concept to understand that duty must be brought into the picture if we are to understand rights. This is so for two reasons: First,
since the claimant also has moral and legal obligations, for example, to
contribute what he can to the common good and to develop his potentiality, to talk only about his claims or rights and to ignore his obligations is a defect in analysis; this has implications regarding claims to
social welfare benefits. Second, to say that a human being has certain
rights usually implies that other persons or the state or certain institutions have correlative duties. This, too, is forgotten by orators on human
rights and by philosophers who discuss only claims or rights without any
reference to the implied correlatives, and that does not advance the solution of difficult social problems.
The above interpretation of the classical psychology of human nature, the normative meaning assigned "natural need," and the juxtaposition of obligation to right in the indicated ways, all, despite indicated
qualifications, support the thesis that men do have human rights, and
that this is not a merely ideological, subjective or emotive utterance.
But are the recently asserted economic rights human rights in the
same sense as the classical civil rights enumerated in our Bill of Rights?
Those who see important differences' 3 argue that the classical civil rights
are universal, have paramount importance, and lend themselves to relatively easy enforcement. They need not be deserved in the sense of being earned, but are recognized simply as fitting the uniqueness of being
human. It is also argued that these characteristics of the classical rights
of man are not truly descriptive of the alleged economic rights. For example, what possible meaning is there in asserting the alleged economic
rights in a country like India? Further, in industrially advanced countries economic claims are distinguished from the classical rights, and
some of them, such as paid holidays, are held to be a luxury, certainly
not an inalienable right.
Others contend that economic rights are as important as civil ones,
and that the implementation of civil, no less than economic, rights in any
country is a matter of practicality. 4 In affluent countries the old notion of charity gives, or should give, way to that of right; therefore, the
correlative duty rests on government since it cannot be warrantably imposed on individuals. Need and fraternity are the grounds of justifica13. See the discussion by Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in
PoLmicAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43 (D. Raphael ed. 1967).
14. See the discussion by Raphael, Human Rights, Old and New, in POLITICAL
THEORY AND THE RiGHTs OF MAN 54 (D. Raphael ed. 1967).
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tion of economic rights, and the availability of adequate resources is
relevant only to the time of their implementation.
"Economic right" embraces a very large area, with very different questions presented by "right to work," "right to education," "right
to paid holidays," "right to a standard of living adequate for health and
well-being," insurance against sickness and so on. In the analysis
of these problems, it would be necessary to employ the distinctions
drawn above, and the factual questions alone are so complex that the
assistance of a panel of experts on each of those problems would be
needed. But there is at least one aspect of the above controversy regarding which the argument of the proponents of economic rights seems
persuasive and that concerns the right of unfortunate persons in industrially advanced countries to a minimal standard of living.
There are cultural differences between the right of poor people to
economic assistance and the classical rights, the reasons for which are
historical and linguistic. In past centuries, especially in agrarian communities, it was much easier for individuals and private agencies to discover needy persons and to help them. Accordingly we have been accustomed to think in terms of charity to the poor, and sensitive scholars
like Mill and Petrajitski (and his students, Sorokin and Timasheff)
drew a basic distinction between duties of beneficence and legal duties in that the former have no correlative rights. In that traditional
view, it seems incongruous to say that a poor man has a right to assistance since "right," although used in a moral sense, takes on some of
the demand-character of a legal right. Social conditions are very different now, particularly in the large industrial countries. If we assume
that private benevolence is inadequate to the present task, then it does
not seem strained to speak of the moral right of needy persons, victims
of circumstances beyond their control, to decent minimal economic assistance.
But if the novelty of such speech and the recency of the new conditions lead some to reject this concept of a right of poor people
to minimal economic assistance, there is another approach that leads
to the same result. There is a very wide consensus among both classical liberals and proponents of a social welfare state that there is a moral
duty to help poor people. There are, of course, gaps between the recognition of a general moral duty and agreement on just what that duty requires and to whom it is owed. As examples, it is a moot question
whether there is a class of poor persons, a subculture, in this country;
there is no way to draw a poverty line in terms of income that is not arbitrary regarding those just above the line; and it may be doubted
whether persons who have deprived themselves of many things owe a
duty to those who have been spendthrifts or allergic to work. Let us
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assume that all these problems have been discussed and that the salient
facts are that millions of our fellow citizens live in conditions of acute
deprivation, that reliance on the charity of individuals is too uncertain
for present needs, and that recourse to law is necessary to implement
the moral duty of assistance. This duty, then, becomes a legal duty,
and if that duty is to be actualized, not only officials but also needy
persons must have correlative legal rights.1"
That implementation of the moral duty of assistance requires recourse to law raises the difficult problems previously mentioned, such as
the bringing to bear of the coercive apparatus of the state on all citizens
and in many ways beyond the requirement to pay taxes, which involves
limitations on freedom as well as the generality and crudeness of legal
systems. There is, also, the question of what laws should be used;
should the criminal law be employed or will civil law suffice or are both
necessary and, if so, at what points? It has often been argued that the
values protected by criminal law, tort law and much of the constitutional
law expressed in the Bill of Rights require for their actualization only
that people be let alone, and that, in contrast, the economic rights require affirmative actions by all citizens and vast undertakings by the
state. Athough this is an over-simplifcation since even early criminal
law imposed affirmative duties on some persons, the gravity of doing
that on a large scale is evident.
One need not take a stand regarding the conflict of economic philosophies to recognize that the gap between the recognition of a moral
duty and its actualization by legal methods is a very large one. For example, governmental welfare programs, obviously, have serious shortcomings. In housing renewal, the principal beneficiaries seem to have
been owners of property, while many poor people, uprooted from their
familiar neighborhoods, have not been provided for in the new buildings. Since need has been the criterion for occupancy, the new structures are filled with broken families, juvenile delinquency becomes concentrated, and local schools suffer. Minimum wage laws have helped
some, but they have also increased unemployment. Poverty programs
have stimulated graft, embezzlement and fraud and their achievements
seem to be problematic. Even specialist advocates acknowledge that
the "war on poverty" is a misnomer. One of them said, "the program
15. The salient example of "absolute duty" (for which, it is said, there is no
correlative right) is in the criminal law. But cf. A. KocoulEK, AN INTRoDUCMON TO
THE SCIENCE OF LAW 257 (1930).
("If there is a Duty, there must be a Claim").
What has given credence to the notion of "absolute duty" in criminal law is that
"legal right" is usually ascribed to particular individuals, not to the community or
to the State. But particular poor persons are ascertainable and actions in their
behalf and class actions do not present the metaphysical difficulty met in ascribing
rights to "the State."
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could be better described as an expedition to find out what the
problems were and how to deal with them."'1 6 Another said, "Five
years is a brief period, and the full dividends-or deficits-of OEO's
[Office of Economic Opportunity] work will not be evident for some
time. . . . The war on poverty will be judged, ultimately, more upon
its success in mobilizing the poor as an effective [political] force than
upon the number of dollars it has placed in their pockets."' 7 A third
writes, "CAA [Community Action Agency] programs have encountered difficulty in reaching, to any significant degree, the so-called
hard-core poor."' 8 A fourth states that he learned "how enormously
resistant institutions are to change, and that it is easier to understand
how change is inhibited than to perceive how to bring it about."' 9 If
these are the opinions of advocates of, and specialists in, the poverty programs, one can easily imagine how the critics of those programs
would evaluate them.
Nonetheless, despite all the difficulties and the failures, Americans
are not likely to shed their compassion for their unfortunate and disadvantaged fellows, especially since that feeling arises from a heightened
sensitivity to the precariousness of the human situation in this century
and the realization that every man is vulnerable to the slings of fortune.
It is not a difference in altruism or compassion that divides students of
these problems. Rather, what divides them are differences regarding
other values, differences in knowledge of the facts, and differences
concerning the methods that should be employed to solve those problems.
CONCLUSION
There are parallels between the necessary participation of private
individuals in poverty programs and the assistance rendered by private
individuals and agencies to convicts after their discharge from penal
institutions. There are parallels between the individualization of treatment incorporated into the criminal law by probation, parole, pre-sentence hearings and the like, and the flexibility of procedures incorporated
in the administration of laws proscribing discrimination, such as the
requirement of informal hearings and recommendations as prerequisites to enforcement in the courts. These developments illustrate one
of the points previously suggested: that even the best legal system
inevitably falls short of achieving desirable and feasible goals, and
16. Miller, Book Review, 385 ANNALS 175, 177 (1969).
17. Davidson, The War on Poverty: An Experiment in Federalism, 385 ANNALS
12, 13 (1969).
18. Kravitz & Kolodner, Community Action, 385 ANNALS 30, 36 (1969).
19. Rein, Choice and Change in the American Welfare System, 385 ANNALS
89, 91 (1969).
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that legal justice needs to be supplemented by the efforts of individuals
both within and without the confines of the law.
Further, the commonality of current attitudes towards both corrective and distributive justice is demonstrated by a heightened interest
in law-in-action. It is not that the law in the books, the statutes and
decisions, is unimportant, but that what counts most is what is done
about those laws, that is, which laws are enforced, against whom and
by whom. Studies of law-in-action would reveal the great difference between prescribed sentences and actual imprisonment, as well as many
injustices, for instance, that various uses of discretion and administrative devices sometimes transform a long sentence for a major felony into
less imprisonment than that served by much less serious offenders. It
is in this context, also, that current efforts to terminate the long delays
that afflict litigation are significant, for "justice delayed is justice denied."
There are other common bonds between corrective and distributive
justice in the 20th century. In both areas, the values of desert, fairness, freedom, and order are involved, although in different contexts. In
both areas, justice requires retention of the value of responsibility, but
traditional views of responsibility are tempered by reference to relevant
psychological, social and economic facts. In both areas there is a need
for consensus on a few basic values, careful study of their interrelations
and of the probable consequences of subordinating one value to others
in specific situations. These conclusions and the above analysis provide
no easy answers in the quest for justice in this century, but they may
serve as premises upon which specific investigations can be carried on.

